Chapter 23
The Legacy of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill: Emerging Science and Policy

One of the scientists whom I interviewed for this book warned, "Our job is not done." Many people who shared their personal stories with me expressed this sense of unfinished business. They feel it was not enough to simply understand or experience how the oil spill caused lingering harm to ecosystems and individuals for fifteen years. They believe either there are fundamental wrongs that need to be fixed to prevent history from repeating itself, or there are fundamental truths that need to be told to improve our quality of life on this planet.

The last two chapters of this book are about the unfinished business of conveying these lessons and recommendations to the public--the stewards of wildlife and wild lands. In this final section, the responsibility shifts from us, the messengers, to you, the reader, because although this book ends, the story of oil will continue for a while longer. We all, especially people in developed nations, will have a role in crafting the final chapter on oil history. As you read 'The Legacy' of the Exxon Valdez oil spill, please tuck this question in the back of your mind: what would have happened if no one had listened to Paul Revere?

Shifting Paradigms: Oil Causes Persistent Harmful Effects

A scientist's view of the natural world is held as a paradigm--an understanding, based on theories, studies, models, and other generalizations, which seeks to accurately reflect and explain observations from the natural world. Paradigms are dynamic, not static; that is, they shift to accommodate new observations, and when paradigms shift, science advances. For example, a scientific paradigm once held that the world was flat, but we no longer believe this.

It should not be surprising in this day of rapid technological advancements that, in the time span of one generation or thirty years, since mos t of our protective standards were first established, our understanding of the effects of oil on humans and wildlife have radically evolved.

In 1999, the U.S. EPA identified twenty-two PAHs as "persistent, bioaccumulative, and toxic (PBT) pollutants" and added the entire class of PAHs to its PBT pollutant list (U.S. EPA 2001). PBT pollutants are 'the worst of the worst' known human health hazards--the list includes mercury, dioxin, PCBs, DDT, and now PAHs. The EPA (2000) states that PBT pollutants are "highly toxic, long-lasting substances that can build up in the food chain to levels that are harmful to humans and ecosystems." In other words, they are persistent and they are bioavailable; that is they are able to spread throughout the ecosystem. Further, "PBTs are associated with a range of adverse human health effects, including the nervous system, reproductive, and developmental problems, cancer, and genetic impacts. Reducing risks from PBTs presents a challenge… because of the pollutants' ability to travel long distances, move easily from air to water or land and linger for generations in people and the environment."

This listing of PAHs on the 'worst of the worst' chemicals' inventory reflects a shift in scientific understanding about the toxic nature of PAHs (ATSDR 2002; Colborn, Dumanoski, and Myers 1996; Steingraber 2001). The Exxon Valdez oil spill played a central role in this drama. In the fifteen years since the Exxon Valdez oil spill, researchers have advanced two new and mutually supporting paradigms in oil toxicity--one in humans and one in wildlife. These advanced understandings of oil toxicity show that acute and chronic symptoms from oil exposure in vertebrates--humans, fish, birds, and mammals--are quite similar, often disabling, and occur at much lower levels of oil than previously thought harmful to life. With wildlife, scientists have completed the circle of understanding from individual to population-level effects. With humans, this full circle has yet to be drawn, but the implications are clear--hence, the new listing for PAHs as persistent bioaccumulative toxins.

Human Harm

The journey to discovery of the effects of oil on human health started nearly a century ago. For example, the aromatic hydrocarbon benzene, a solvent, was considered dangerous as early as the 1920s. As a potent carcinogen, "The only absolutely safe level for benzene is zero" states a 1948 health review prepared for American Petroleum Institute (Rampton and Stauber 2001, 85). Over fifty years later, the risk has not changed (ATSDR 1997). NIOSH, the research arm of OSHA, lists no recommended exposure limit for benzene is its Health Hazard Evaluation Report for the Exxon Valdez oil spill. Instead NIOSH investigators state, "The ACGIH [American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygenists] considers benzene to be a suspected human carcinogen and recommends that exposures should be kept to a minimum" (NIOSH 1991, 41, Table 2, footnote e).
According to Exxon's own air quality monitoring data (Med-Tox 1989c), the highest levels of benzene to which cleanup workers were exposed occurred on beaches treated with pressurized hot water wash where benzene levels exceeded the legally enforceable OSHA permissible exposure limit (PEL) by almost eight times (Table A.1).

With medical advancements in diagnostic tools and increased appreciation of th e subtle functions of the human body, crude oil was found to be even more hazardous to humans than previously thought. Inhalation of oil mist and PAH aerosols was found to result in short- and long-term respiratory damage and central nervous system disorders as well as chronic blood (anemia, leukemia), liver, and kidney disorders; endocrine disruption; and immune suppression (Chapter 10). In part because of these concerns, oil spills were declared hazardous waste cleanups in March 1989 (OSHA, 1989).

According to Exxon's air quality monitoring data (Med-Tox 1989a-c), the highest levels of the carcinogen benzene and oil mist to which workers were exposed occurred on beaches treated with pressurized hot water wash and exceeded the legally enforceable OSHA PEL by eight and four times, respectively (Table A.1). Maximum exposure to PAH aerosols exceeded the legally enforceable OSHA PEL by two times. Further, Exxon scientists had published a study before the spill showing that standard PELs need to be reduced to adequately protect workers with extended work shifts (Exxon 1986). According to Exxon's study, the OSHA PELs should have been--but were not--reduced for cleanup workers b y at least two to three times for their daily shifts of twelve to eighteen hours. Occupational health physician Dr. Daniel Teitelbaum, who served as expert witness in Stubblefield v. Exxon (1994), stated the OSHA PELs should have been reduced by 80 percent (Teitelbaum 1994). This means the over-exposures stated above are conservative by a factor of two to five times.

Solvents are also potent human health hazards with effects that largely overlap those from inhalation of oil mists and PAH aerosols. Solvents are key ingredients in industrial dispersants, used on oil spills, and in commercial degreasers. For example, the solvent 2-butoxyethanol is an ingredient in several products used during the Exxon Valdez cleanup such as Inipol, Corexit 9527, and Simple Green (ATSDR 1998). Known health hazards of products used during the cleanup include acute and chronic respiratory damage and central nervous system disorders, chronic liver, kidney, and blood (anemia) disorders; immune suppression; and acute skin disorders (dermatitis) (Chapter 10). Simple Green also damages developing fetuses, according to the EPA's website on janitorial products to avoid (U.S. EPA 2003).

According to Exxon's air quality monitoring data (Med-Tox 1989c), the highest levels of 2-butoxyethanol to which workers were exposed exceeded by two times the legally enforceable OSHA PEL (Table A.1). This over-exposure is conservative--it does not consider the NIOSH recommendation or reductions for extended work hours. Exxon did not monitor exposure to commercial degreasers such as De-Solv-It, Citra-Solv, Simple Green, Limonene, and CitraKleen, which were used liberally to clean everything from workers' skin and clothes to skiffs, booms, and large vessels. Dr. Teitelbaum (1994) was appalled by the lack of monitoring of solvent exposures in Exxon's worker safety program.
The oil industry was well aware of the health hazards of inhalation of various fractions of crude oil and its refined products before the spill. Human health effects were documented in the Amoco Cadiz spill off the northern coast of France in 1978. At least one petrochemical company recommended a PEL for crude oil that was twenty-five times lower than the OSHA PEL (Lyondell Petrochemical Co. 1990). Exxon had developed an extensive library on health effects from inhalation of oil vapors, mists, and aerosols--and proper protection for company employees as evidenced in the toxic tort lawsuit Stubblefield v. Exxon (1994).

Exxon's pressurized hot water wash created oil mists and PAH aerosols. As shown in Chapter 2, Exxon's worker safety program failed to adequately protect cleanup crews from overexposure to dangerous chemicals. According to Exxon's clinical data (Exxon 1989), 6,722 cleanup workers reported respiratory symptoms similar to cold and flu symptoms--or symptoms of chemical poisoning from inhalation of oil mists and aerosols. Neither the Exxon and VECO medical staff on the cleanup nor the cleanup workers themselves were trained to recognize--or treat in the case of the medical staff--symptoms associated with chemical exposures.

All 6,722 respiratory illnesses were reported by Exxon as "Upper Respiratory Infections" (URIs), rather than work-related illnesses, and dubbed by workers as "the Valdez Crud" (Stranahan 2003) Since OSHA does not require reporting of URIs or specifically, colds and flu (OSHA, 2004a), Exxon dodged the long-term health monitoring requirements for hazardous waste cleanups. Workers did not receive early (in most cases, any) treatment for chemical poisoning. Many became sick with classic chronic symptoms of exposure to crude oil and cleaning products (solvents) used on the beaches. As one worker put it, "I just kept wondering, 'how come I got the Valdez Crud for the next ten years?'"

Continued