Hazardous by Nature

Oil spill response began the winter before the spill in 1988-1989 when federal scientists, state regulators, and CDFU fishermen, including myself, agonized over the dispersant guidelines proposed by oilmen and supported by Coast Guard. Dispersant use is an emotionally charged issue. Oil companies manufacture and sell dispersants as a first line of defense in response to oil spills. Dispersants act like liquid soap to break up surface oil slicks into tiny droplets that must then be driven by wind and wave action into the water column and diluted with huge volumes of water (Lethcoe and Nurnberger 1989). Dispersants are the oilmen's way of solving pollution by dilution. Essentially, the oil slick "vanishes" from the sea surface. Out of sight, out of mind, and definitely away from being a public relations nightmare.

The trouble is that the tiny droplets of dispersed oil are very toxic to fish and other creatures in the water column under the sea surface. Dispersants are also only 10 to 15 percent effective in cold water with viscous North Slope crude, which leaves the bulk of the oil, potentially, to strand on beaches (Fingas, Bobra, and Velicogna 1987). Why risk fish and the beaches, fishermen asked. CDFU preferred mechanical cleanup of oil--physically removing as much as possible from the water--instead of using our fishing water to dilute and disperse toxic oil.

The Initial Guidelines for Dispersant Use that were approved just two weeks prior to the spill is a compromise (ADEC 1993; Lethcoe and Nurnberger 1989). It divides the Sound into three zones, following recommendations by the National Research Council (1989). Deep open water along the tanker traffic lanes and most of the central Sound is designated as Zone 1, where dispersant use is pre-approved, except when sensitive marine life like herring is in the water column. Beaches and the intertidal and shallow nearshore areas are Zone 3, where dispersant use is banned to avoid concentrating the toxic dispersed oil in this biologically productive region. In Zone 3, dispersants can be used on a case-by-case basis with approval from the EPA and the state. The bulk of the Sound between deep water and shallow beaches is designated as Zone 2, where dispersant use is conditional in order to protect sensitive wildlife and requires approval by the EPA and the state.

Two weeks later--when Captain Joe Hazelwood radioed the Coast Guard at half past midnight to report his tanker was aground on Bligh Reef and "evidently… leaking some oil"--our dispersant guidelines were put to the test.

So began the first oil spill cleanup in the history of the United States to be conducted under the Occupational Safety and Health Act's Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response standard (OSHA 1989). The ink was barely dry in the regulation change. Less than three weeks earlier, OSHA administrators and organized labor had successfully argued against Exxon, among others, that crude oil and petroleum products pose significant health and safety hazards (U.S. Congress House 1989a, 1056-1057). The Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response (Hazwoper) training requires forty hours of safety training, special procedures and equipment, medical surveillance, and long-term record keeping.

Under hazardous waste cleanup standards, all workers are supposed to get information on every single hazardous compound they might encounter on the job. Basic information on a compound of concern is provided in its "Material Safety Data Sheet (MSDS)," which is required to be given to workers as part of normal Hazwoper training.

MSDS excerpts for some of the compounds of concern present during the 1989 cleanup, including oil and three representative solvents--a dispersant, a "bioremediation" product, and an all-purpose degreaser (Sidebar 3)--warn of potential short-term (acute) and long-term (chronic) symptoms. Acute symptoms of exposure include dermatitis, headaches, dizziness, nausea, and central nervous system problems. Chronic symptoms of exposure include anemia and other blood disorders (such as leukemia), fetal defects, liver and kidney damage, and "toxic systemic" effects (or total body poison). MSDS excerpts warn to avoid exposure to vapors and aerosols and, in two cases, to keep the product out of sewers and watercourses.

One would think that 'forewarned is forearmed,' but sadly, this was not the case.

Initial Spill Response to Oil on the Water

As succinctly stated by "Ernie" Piper, author of the 1993 Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation (ADEC) final report on the state's role in spill response: "Oil spill response is most effective when oil is on the water, rather than stranded on shorelines. The faster responders act, the better chance they have. The effectiveness of most on-the-water techniques drops substantially as the oil weathers, emulsifies, and large slicks break up" (ADEC 1993, 49).

Every oil spill is different, every cleanup is different, but the spill response technologies and techniques are roughly the same--and largely ineffective. Coast Guard Vice Admiral Clyde Robbins, the federal on-scene coordinator for the cleanup in 1989, was shocked to find oil spill response technology no further advanced than what he had seen fifteen years earlier (ADEC 1993, 51).

On-the-water spill response included briefly, burning and dispersant use. The initial dispersant of choice was Corexit 9527, an Exxon product. However, first it was too calm and then it was too stormy for effective dispersant use (Lethcoe and Nurnberger 1989, 44-49). Barrier booms to contain oil and skimmers to pick up the contained oil were used in summer1989, initially in open water and then, with marginal results, nearshore to contain and pick up oil and oil/solvent mixtures draining from treated beaches.

After the fierce storm on the third day, whatever hope had existed to contain the oil was lost. It was clear, even as Exxon mobilized more and more people, vessels, and equipment to respond to the larger slicks and all the shredded pieces moving through the southwest Sound, that shoreline cleanup would become a bigger priority than on-the-water response. The on-the-water spill response extended roughly through mid May when the shoreline treatment began in earnest (ADEC 1993; Harrison 1991).

Before the transition from on-the-water response to shoreline cleanup, visiting Congressman Peter DeFazio (D-4th OR) summed up the situation. "Alyeska has had to rely on a mosquito fleet (i.e., commercial fishermen), sport fishing boats, and the local communities to help them preserve the remnants of a great ecosystem. I think that is a tragedy beyond belief" (U.S. Congress House 1989a, 146). Unfortunately, the real tragedy in terms of human health was about to begin.

Continued