Table 5
The Legacy--Key Lessons Learned from Exxon Valdez Oil Spill
Shifting Paradigms: Oil Causes Persistent Harmful
Effects
1. Oil acted like the persistent, bioavailable,
toxic (PBT) pollutant that it is; it took over a decade for researchers
to reach a new understanding of oil effects on humans and marine ecosystems.
2. Cleanup workers appear to have been overexposed to oil mist, PAH
aerosols, and other chemicals relative to NIOSH recommended exposure
limits, a more conservative standard than the OSHA permissible exposure
limits.
3. There was a higher prevalence of acute respiratory symptoms, stomach
distress (poisoning), and potential neurological symptoms among 1989
cleanup workers compared to those reported by the Alaska workforce in
1987; there is a higher prevalence of chronic airway distress, neurological
symptoms, and chemical sensitivity among 1989 cleanup workers who were
at a higher risk of oil and/or chemical exposure than less exposed workers.
4. Oil is harmful to fish and wildlife at 1,000 times lower levels than
those thought to be the toxicity threshold in the 1970s; PAHs concentrations
in the low parts per billion cause persistent and measurable population-level
harm to fish, seabirds, and marine mammals.
5. Public policies (laws) on oil pollution are grossly under-protective
of life.
Reassessing our Indicators of Individual Health
1. Risk assessments are bogus: they cannot deliver
on their promise of worker/public protection because they are not based
on realistic parameters.
2. We do not know the full and true adverse health effects from crude
oil exposures, one of the oldest known human health hazards; we do not
know the full and true adverse health effects of most chemicals on our
markets--and in our environment--today.
3. Traditional medical training does not prepare doctors to recognize,
diagnose, and t
reat chemical-induced illnesses and diseases; because
of this, our worker/public health policies and our legal system do not
support victims of chemical exposures and illnesses; because of this,
we feign ignorance of chemical illnesses at the expense of worker/public
health and the environment.
4. Biomarkers are effective and accurate diagnostic tools for subtle
chronic and systemic effects of crude oil, solvents, and many other
environmental pollutants.
Assessing Population Health
1. Unrealistic risk assessments and short-term
bioassays are not the proper tools to assess population-level and ecological
harm to people and wildlife from crude oil, solvents, and other environmental
pollutants.
2. To most accurately assess effects of environmental pollution, biomarkers
should be used in concert with epidemiology or ecosystem-based (population)
studies.
3. Effective population studies involve a holistic approach with five
elements: collaborative efforts among multiple scientific disciplines
and among scientists and the public; an inclusive and comprehensive
planning process; identification and selection of key (sentinel and
indicator) species (or subgroups of human population); and comparisons
over time and geographic areas.
4. Wildlife scientists fully utilized the "opportunity" presented
by the Exxon Valdez oil spill to complete the circle from individual
to population-level health effects, which resulted in a new understanding
of oil effects; medical researchers have not yet conducted parallel
studies on human health effects from this spill. The opportunity is
still there.
Science, Politics, and the Public Interest
1. Scientific advancements through paradigm shifts
are a confusing messy business for all involved, including the public,
as starkly demonstrated by the polarized interpretations and conclusions
of Exxon scientists and public-trust scientists from their EVOS studies.
2. It is, unfortunately, quite an accepted practice for entities with
interests vested in t
he old paradigm to resist change by conducting
bad science or "tobacco science" to subvert the public process
(which depends upon public understanding of the risk/issues) and stall
undesirable policy changes; this drama is still in play in the case
of the EVOS wildlife science. (Given Exxon's track record, it is anticipated
that a similar drama would begin should an independent epidemiology
study commence on EVOS cleanup workers.)
3. When scientists disagree and technical controversies spill into the
public arena, the media is largely unable to sort out the truth and
relevant details--the media focuses instead on the controversy itself;
whenever scientists duel in public, it is time for the public to pay
attention and try to understand what is at stake for the public interest,
irrespective of media reports.
Designing Laws to Deter Spills
1. Spillers should not be left in charge of the
cleanup; they have a basic conflict of interest between their economic
self-interest and the public interests of environmental restoratio
n
and protection of worker/public health.
2. Human health problems are likely not unusual for spill responders
and should be anticipated for any oil spill cleanup that involves people
working on beaches or with dispersants (i.e., products with solvents
or hazardous chemicals); this liability is largely unrecognized at this
point because response efforts largely focus on the environment.
3. Laws designed to prevent and respond to spills and to protect workers'
health during oil spill cleanups do not work to protect the public interest
when rich corporations spill oil. Further, they actually create situations
in which the spiller can recover significant sums through accounting
and tax strategies: this clearly undercuts the goal of deterrence.
4. Industrial self-reporting of spill volumes should be verified by
the U.S. Coast Guard with independent surveyors.